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I. IDENTITY OF PETITIONERS 
The petitioners are Life Designs Ranch, Inc. and Vincent and 
Bobbie Barranco1• 
II. CITATION TO COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
Life Designs requests review of the following published 
decision of the Washington State Court of Appeals, Division III: Life 
Designs Ranch, Inc. v. Sommer, No. 32922-4-III (Nov. 12, 2015). 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the following issues presented fall squarely within 
RAP 13-4(b) because the Appeals Court decision conflicts with 
decisions of the Supreme Court and of the Appeals Court, and 
involve significant questions of constitutional law and issues of 
substantial public interest, such that acceptance of review is proper. 
2. Whether Life Designs is entitled to partial summary 
judgment as a matter of law regarding the liability of Mr. Sommer2 
for defamation per se. 
3. Whether genuine Issues of material fact exist regarding 
whether Mr. Sommer is liable for defamation per se. 
4. Whether the Appeals Court erred in holding Life Designs to a 
new legal standard for defamation per se that now requires 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, "Life Designs" refers collectively to all petitioners. 
2 "Mr. Sommer" shall refer to Respondent/Defendant Michael Sommer. 
1 
defamation per se plaintiffs to show that defamation was somehow 
"extreme" and "severe" sufficient to survive summary judgment. 
s. Whether false statements that Mr. Sommer posted to his 
website are not non-actionable opinion. 
6. Whether genuine issues of material fact exist regarding 
whether the statements Mr. Sommer published were false. 
7· Whether Mr. Sommer republished content of the HEAL 
website by posting to his website a hyperlink to that website with 
directions to "click or cut and paste the link below." 
8. Whether Mr. Sommer interfered with Life Designs' business 
expectancy by improper means in that his interference was 
wrongful in relation to the common law of defamation. 
g. Whether the Declarations of Vincent Barranco and Clay 
Garrett create genuine issues of material fact as to both causation 
and damages, sufficient to survive summary dismissal of claims for 
defamation, tortious interference, and false light invasion of 
privacy; and, specifically, whether evidence of a sequence of events 
in proximity of time-alone, or with more-is sufficient to give the 
issue of proximate causation to the jury. 
10. Whether genuine issues of material fact exist that Mr. 
Sommer placed the Barrancos in a false light and that, as a result, 
2 
the Barrancos suffered damages. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Factual Background. 
Owned by Vincent and Bobbie Barranco, Life Designs 
operates therapeutic and transitional programs for young adults 
with destructive behavioral patterns such as addiction. (CP 12, 47). 
It operates a treatment program in Cusick, Washington, on the 
International Selkirk Loop in the Pend Oreille River Valley. (CP 12, 
48, 52). This scenic setting boasts commanding views of mountains, 
the Pend Oreille River, and living trees. (lg.). The therapeutic 
natural setting is a critical component of Life Designs' program and 
profitability. (CP 47-48). On average, thirty-eight percent of clients 
completing this program continue to a transitional program in 
Spokane, Washington. (CP 48). Life Designs generally operates its 
Cusick, Washington program at maximum occupancy: twelve 
clients at $52,200 per client and a $1,200 initial interview charge. 
(lg.). The transitional program costs $12,000 per client. (lg.). 
Life Designs employed Clay Garrett as Program/ Admissions 
Director to develop and continue client enrollment. (CP 197-98). He 
worked with potential clients and their parents to determine 
whether Life Designs would be a suitable fit. (CP 198). He also 
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worked with Educational Consultants who are hired by parents of 
potential clients to assist in selecting a recovery program. (CP 198-
99). Consultants typically recommend three programs from which a 
client chooses one. (CP 199). Life Designs had continually received 
client referrals including referrals from Educational Consultants. 
(CP 201). Mr. Garrett was also responsible for Life Designs' online 
marketing and he directed potential clients, parents, and referral 
sources to Life Designs' website. (CP 198-200). 
Mr. Sommer contracted with Life Designs to send his son to 
the Cusick, Washington program, but later disputed Life Designs' 
billing. (CP 48). On June 26, 2015, he sent Life Designs an email: 
I am willing to get legal with this. Are you? I would 
hope that the most important thing to you is your 
reputation. We all know how easily 
reputations can be destroyed, without the 
legal system even getting involved. But I 
would go both routes if I have to. You are 
wrong on allfronts. Please reconsider before we find 
it necessary to proceed. 
(CP 257 (emphasis added)). He chose the extra-judicial route. 
Mr. Sommer contacted one of Life Designs' referral sources, 
Chad Balagna, and instructed him to stop sending Life Designs any 
referrals. (CP 202-203, 241-243). On June 28, 2012, Mr. Sommer 
obtained the domain name www.lifedesignsranchinc.com, which is 
nearly identical to Life Designs' prior and present domain names. 
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(CP 48, 254). Mr. Sommer uploaded a host of false factual 
statements concerning, among other statements, the education and 
experience of Life Designs' staff, the quality of its recovery 
programs, and the therapeutic environment offered to its clients. 
(CP 248-51). In addition, Mr. Sommer posted a link to a separate 
website containing defamatory content: 
For more info click or cut and past the link below 
http:/ jwww.heal-online.orgjlifedesigns.htm 
("HEAL Website") (CP 249). That website falsely conveys that Life 
Designs employee, Kimberly Mlinarik, worked at a program where, 
the HEAL website reports, a young man died. (CP 65) 
Prior to the time Mr. Sommer posted his website, Life 
Designs had an average historical referral rate of 17 potential clients 
per quarter and had an average enrollment rate of 12 students. (CP 
49). However, during the operational period of Mr. Sommer's 
website, Life Designs' referral rate plummeted and client 
enrollment abruptly declined. (Id.). This website caused Life 
Designs to lose nine to twelve clients. (CP 202). Except for Mr. 
Sommer's tortious conduct, everything remained constant. (M.). 
B. Procedural Posture. 
On July 13, 2013, Life Designs filed an Amended Complaint, 
advancing claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious 
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interference. (CP 11-19). On January 16, 2014, the trial court denied 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding 
Liability for Defamation Per Se. (CP 88-92). The trial court 
dismissed all of Life Designs' claims with prejudice by two 
subsequent summary judgment orders. (CP 343-46, 348-51). On 
November 12, 2015, the Appeals Court published its decision 
affirming the trial court, with the Honorable Judge Fearing writing 
a detailed dissent. (Appx. A). Life Designs petitions for review. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. The Appeals Court's Decision is in Conflict with 
Decisions of this Court and the Appeals Court that 
Allow a Trier of Fact to Decide whether a Statement 
is Defamatory Per Se Irrespective of whether it is 
"Extreme" or "Severe." 
The Appeals Court concluded that, as a matter of law, the 
false statements at issue are not defamatory per se. (Op. at p. 6). To 
reach this conclusion, it erroneously read Caruso v. Local Union No. 
6go of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America to require defamation to be 
"extreme" and "severe" as a condition to giving the issue of 
defamation per se to the jury and, in applying its new standard, 
reasoned that Mr. Sommer's defamatory statements did not rise to 
that level. 100 Wn.2d 343, 670 P.2d 240 (1983). (Op. at p. 6). 
6 
Caruso involved a defamation claim arising from a "do not 
patronize" publication. Id. at 345, 670 P.2d 240. This Court held a 
tortious interference claim must be dismissed and, because the jury 
verdict was unsegregated, remanded for trial on the defamation 
claim. Id. at 354-55, 670 P.2d 240. Addressing jury instructions, the 
Court stated: "[i]n all but extreme cases the jury should determine 
whether the article was libelous per se." Id. at 354, 670 P.2d 240. 
Nothing in Caruso requires a plaintiff to prove defamation 
was "extreme" or "severe." Rather, a publication is defamatory per 
se, irrespective of whether it is "extreme" or "severe" where it: 
(1) exposes a living person to hatred, contempt, 
ridicule or obloquy, or to deprive him of the benefit of 
public confidence or social intercourse; or (2) injures 
him in his business, trade, profession, or office. 
Id. at 353, 670 P.2d 240 (citing cases); see, M·, Vern Sims Ford, 
Inc. v. Hagel, 42 Wn. App. 675, 684, 713 P.2d 736 (1986) (affirming 
award of presumed damages where, after business dispute, 
customer mailed flyers calling business and salesperson "thieves"); 
Wood v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist., 107 Wn. App. 550, 557, 574, 27 
P.3d 1208 (2001) (reversing summary judgment dismissal based on 
a statement that one's job performance was "lacking"); Waechter v. 
Carnation Co., 5 Wn. App. 121, 485 P.2d 1000 (1971) (affirming 
jury award based on statements about competitor's milk quality). 
7 
In determining that this case was not "extreme" or "severe," 
the Appeals Court reasoned that, unlike Caruso, there "were [no] 
calls where people said they would not send their family 
member/client to Life Designs." (Op. at p. 6). However, this fact 
goes to damages, not liability, and damages are presumed where a 
statement is defamatory per se. Maison de France, Ltd. v. Mais 
Oui!, Inc. 126 Wn. App. 34, 52-54, 108 P.3d 787 (2005). The 
website falls squarely within the scope of defamation per se. 
B. The Appeals Court's Decision Conflicts with 
Decisions of the Appeals Court that Permit a Private 
Defamation Per Se Plaintiff to Recover Presumed 
Damages where No Matters of Public Concern are 
Involved without Proof of Malice. 
The Appeals Court decision conflicts with prior decisions of 
that court to the extent its newly fabricated "extreme" or "severe 
publication" standard is tantamount to a requirement that a private 
defamation per se plaintiff prove malice where the issues are not of 
public concern. I d. at 54, 126 Wn. App. 34 (explaining that "where 
no matters of public concern are involved, presumed damages to a 
private plaintiff for defamation without proof of actual malice 
may be available" (holding under Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985)); Momah v. Bharti, 
144 Wn. App. 731, 740 n. 3, 182 P.3d 455 (2008) (same). Life 
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Designs are private plaintiffs and no matters of public concern are 
involved. However, Life Designs satisfies even the malice standard. 
C. The Appeals Court Decision Violates the Substantial 
Public Interest of Protecting Individuals and 
Businesses from Harm to Reputation Caused by 
Certain Types of Publications where Proof of Actual 
Damages is Impossible Notwithstanding Near 
Certainty that Damages Resulted in Fact. 
"The interest protected is the reputation of the one alleged to 
be defamed." Ward v. Painters Local Union No. 300,41 Wn.2d 859, 
864, 252 P.2d 253 (1953). The Appeals Court's new standard will 
leave without any remedy a host of individuals and businesses 
surely having suffered significant harm to their reputation but 
where proof of damages is impossible3. Such outcome is intolerable 
to the core policies forming the foundation for defamation per se: 
The rationale of the common-law rules has been the 
experience and judgment of history that ''proof of 
actual damage will be impossible in a great many 
cases where, from the character of the defamatory 
words and circumstances of publication, it is all but 
certain that serious harm has resulted in fact." 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 760 (quoting W. Prosser, Law of 
Torts § 112, p. 765 (4th ed. 1971)). Notably, here, the Appeals Court 
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Life Designs' defamation 
3 While the Declarations of Vincent Barranco and Clay Garrett (CP 47-63, 196-
230) provide ample admissible evidence of causation and damages, the Appeals 
Court disagreed. (Op. at p. 12). Nevertheless, Life Designs is entitled to 
presumed damages for defamation per se. 
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claim, due to, both courts incorrectly reasoned, lack of evidence of 
causation and damages, notwithstanding that "it is ... certain that 
serious harm has resulted in fact." Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
Indeed, this new standard will foreclose meritorious 
defamation per se claims because, on the one hand, the publication 
must be "extreme" and sufficiently "severe" to even survive 
summary judgment but, on the other hand, "extreme" and "severe" 
statements are typically non-actionable opinion or hyperbole. 
D. The Appeals Court's Determination that the Website 
Contains Only Opinion Conflicts with Decisions of 
this Court and the Appeals Court. 
The Appeals Court erroneously concluded that Mr. Sommer's 
website was non-actionable opinion. (Op. at p. 7-11). The Appeals 
Court considered, but improperly applied, the following factors: 
(1) the medium and context in which the statement 
was published, (2) the audience to whom it was 
published, and (3) whether the statement implied 
undisclosed facts. 
Dunlap v. Wayne, 105 Wn.2d 529,539,716 P.2d 842 (1986). 
1. The Appeals Court Did Not Properly 
Consider the Medium and Context. 
Using the internet, Mr. Sommer crafted a website that took 
on the appearance of Life Designs' actual website, a type of website 
known as a spoof website. (CP 248-251). While no published 
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Washington case exists addressing defamation in a spoof website, 
common law rules of defamation apply with equal force in this 
context and easily adapt to a changing technological landscape. 
Although the Appeals Court recognized spoof websites may 
be actionable, it determined that Mr. Sommer's website was not in 
fact a spoof website due to his use of the word "seems," specifically: 
"'healing is not done and seems to be very limited in it's [sic] 
attempt."' (Op. at pp. 3, 8 (quoting CP 251)). The Appeals Court, 
however, went a step further when it reasoned that, because "Mr. 
Sommer did not attempt to pass his website off as Life Designs' 
official website" (i.e. not a spoof website), it necessarily followed 
that his website "suggested opinions, not facts." (Op. at p. 8). This 
ruling conflicts with Washington law that websites that are not 
spoof websites may still contain false statements forming a basis for 
a defamation claim. See, M·· Momah, 144 Wn. App. at 751-54, 182 
P.3d 455 (defamation involving article posted to webpage). 
Furthermore, the Appeals Court did not consider all Dunlap factors 
before jumping to its decision that the entire website was opinion. 
2. The Appeals Court Did Not Properly 
Consider the Unique Audience. 
The Appeals Court did not properly consider the 
expectations of the audience. Failing to reflect on the website as a 
11 
whole, it instead latched onto this: "'[t]hinking about going to or 
sending someone you love to Life Designs Ranch?? Read this first." 
(Op. at p. 9 (quoting CP 6o)). The Appeals Court concluded that the 
website contained mere opinion because this language suggested 
the website was a review. (Op. at p. g). Reviews may be defamatory. 
The Appeals Court overlooks critical context. The audience 
was: young adults, their parents, and referral sources expecting to 
find factual information concerning Life Designs for the purpose of 
assessing the program's suitability for young adults on their path to 
recovery. (CP 199-200). Also, Mr. Sommer's website contained no 
interactive feature, such as a blog or a chat room, inviting past and 
potential clients to offer competing viewpoints and to engage in any 
ongoing dialogue. (CP 248-51). 
3· The Appeals Court Did Not Properly 
Consider whether the Website Implied 
Undisclosed Facts. 
"The ... most crucial factor addresses whether a listener 
unknown to the plaintiff can judge the truthfulness of the 
statement." Davis v. Fred's Appliance, Inc., 171 Wn. App. 348, 366, 
287 P.3d 51 (2012). Listeners unknown to Life Designs could take 
the following as truthful statements of fact, among others: 
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• What you get . .. 2 or 3 twelve step meetings a 
week in a very small western Washington 
community where the only young adults m 
attendance are those from Life Designs ranch. 
• Who should Go? You should go to Life Designs if: . 
. . You believe that it takes no education or experience 
with substance abuse, or compassion for the young 
adult who is recovering from a substance addiction 
to help them become the person they want to be. 
• What you get ... A visual experience of pine trees, 
dead pine trees, falling down pine trees, 
disintegrated pine trees, and more pine trees. River, 
can't be seen. Mountains, can't be seen. 
(M.). 
These statements are objectively false. Nevertheless, the 
Appeals Court incorrectly reasoned that the factors weighed in favor 
of Mr. Sommer because Life Designs' real website was made 
available to Mr. Sommer's audience. (Op. at pp. 8-n). However, 
that true facts are assessable to an audience to whom false 
statements are published does not somehow turn those false factual 
statements into ones of opinion. See Dissent Op. at p. 19 
(recognizing that "[n]o principle of law excuses defamatory 
statements on the ground that the reader may find the true facts 
elsewhere"). Courts must consider the context in which a 
publication is made, not the entire universe of factual information. 
The Appeals Court even recognizes that "Mr. Sommer 
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incorrectly described Life Designs as being located in Western 
Washington" but nevertheless concluded the entire website IS 
opinion. (Op. at p. 10). This statement is objectively false. 
Furthermore, the Appeals Court simply writes off the false 
statement concerning the compassion of Life Designs' staff as "a 
subjective determination" and reasoned that, as such, it was 
opinion. (Op. at p. 10). However, a jury could find this so-called 
"subjective determination" is objectively false. (ld.). 
E. The Appeals Court Extended Freedom of Speech 
Principals Too Far and Violated the Substantial 
Public Interest of Protecting Reputational Interests. 
This case presents tension between constitutional freedom of 
speech principals and the substantial public interest of protecting 
one's reputation from false and defamatory publications. The 
Appeals Court set forth the following misguided policy: 
From a policy standpoint, allowing businesses to 
sue any unhappy consumer for what they posted 
online for defamation would stifle freedom of 
speech. The Internet is a medium where statements 
expressing opinions in the context of reviewing 
businesses and services are often found. 
(Op. at p. 8-g). However, precluding businesses from suing 
"unhappy consumer[s]" for defamatory statements posted to the 
Internet would encourage people to use the Internet to spread 
defamatory content with impunity. Such anything-goes approach 
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to defamatory internet posts flies in the face of the very interest the 
tort of defamation aims to protect: one's reputational interest. 
F. The Appeals Court's Conclusion that a Hyper link 
Cannot Constitute Republication is in Conflict with 
Decisions of the Appeals Court and Raises Issues of 
Substantial Public Interest. 
This case presents to the Court an issue of first impression: 
whether posting a hyperlink to a webpage communicates the 
content of the webpage to third persons such that the hyperlink 
may constitute republication of the website to which the link leads. 
Here, Mr. Sommer republished the content of the HEAL 
website by directing his audience to access it, as follows: 
For more info click or cut and paste the link below 
http:/ jwww.heal-online.org/lifedesignsjhtm. 
(CP 249). The Appeals Court held a hyperlink cannot constitute 
republication, reasoning that a hyperlink is akin to a mere reference 
rather than a new communication of content. (Op. at p. 14). 
This conclusion conflicts with decisions of the Appeals Court 
confirming that posting content to a website may constitute 
republication. Momah, 144 Wn. App. at 752-54, 182 P.3d 455. As 
explained in Lamon v. City of Westport: 
The placing of the file in the public library would 
constitute, assuming communication of its contents 
to a third party, a republication of statements made . 
. . . The republication of a defamatory statement, 
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being a separate publication, may make the second 
publisher liable .... 
. . . . Were the file placed on a library rack where the 
public could read it without having to request it and 
receive it from the library staff, the inference of 
publication would be strong. 
44 Wn. App. 664, 668, 723 P.2d 470 (1986). The Internet is the 
library of the technology era; posting a hyperlink to a webpage is 
the modern day equivalent of placing a file on a library shelf. The 
Appeals Court, thus, failed to appreciate the nature ofhyperlinks. A 
hyperlink is more than a reference; it is a vehicle taking the reader 
directly and instantly to the webpage to which it leads. See Benson 
v. Or. Processing Serv., Inc., 136 Wn. App. 587, 589 n.1, 150 P.3d 
154 (2007) ("A ... hyperlink is an electronic link providing direct 
access from one distinctively marked place in [an electronic] 
document to another .... " (internal quotation omitted)). 
As a policy matter, to conclude that a hyperlink cannot 
constitute republication of the content to which it leads would 
encourage defamers to exponentially increase defamatory 
statements to the world without fear of liability. Momah, 144 Wn. 
App. at 754, 182 P.3d 455. A hyperlink is not a license to defame. 
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G. The Appeals Court's Conclusion that Life Designs 
Lacked Proof of Causation and Damages Conflicts 
with Decisions of this Court and the Appeals Court 
that a Plaintiff Need Not Submit Direct Evidence-
and that a "Coincidence in Time" May Constitute 
Circumstantial Evidence-Sufficient to Create a 
Factual Issue for a Jury Regarding these Issues. 
Life Designs submitted the Declaration of Vincent Barranco, 
an owner of Life Designs, in which he explained that, during the 
quarter that Mr. Sommer posted his defamatory website, Life 
Designs received no new clients, but had historically received a 
quarterly average of 4.6 clients, and that it had an average of just 
over six referrals per quarter, where it had historically received a 
quarterly average of 17 referrals. (CP 47-50). This trend continued. 
(ld.). Life Designs also submitted the Declaration of Clay Garrett 
who set forth similar data trends and, further, expert opinion: 
Based on my experience and expertise in the role of 
admissions director of an after-care program like 
Life Designs and other roles in this field, and after 
completing the analysis of Sommer's spoof website 
on Life Designs client enrollment, it is my conclusion 
that the website caused Life Designs to lose referrals 
and consequently 9-12 students. 
(CP 202). The Appeals Court correctly concluded that Mr. Garrett's 
Declaration was admissible as an expert opinion. (Op. at p. 11-12). 
Nevertheless, that Appeals Court affirmed dismissal of Life 
Designs' claims because, it reasoned, Life Designs lacked direct 
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evidence of causation and damages including: (a) that Mr. Balagna 
took Mr. Sommer's advice and stopped referring clients; and (b) 
that no client, potential client, or referral sources submitted an 
affidavit stating that they no longer trusted Life Designs or chose to 
not enroll in its program due to the website. (Op. 11-12, 16-17). 
The Appeals Court's decision conflicts with Washington law. 
"[P]roximate cause ... may be shown by circumstantial evidence." 
Hernandez v. W. Farmers Ass'n, 76 Wn.2d 422,425,456 P.2d 1020 
(1969); Conrad ex rei. Conrad v. Alderwood Manor, 119 Wn. App. 
275, 281, 78 P.3d 177 (2003) ("plaintiff need not establish 
causation by direct and positive evidence"). Proximate cause is for 
the jury to decide unless "the facts are undisputed and the 
inferences therefrom are plain and incapable of reasonable doubt 
or difference of opinion." Bernethy v. Walt Failor's, Inc., 97 Wn.2d 
929, 935, 653 P.2d 280 (1982) (internal quotation omitted). Life 
Designs need not produce direct evidence; circumstantial evidence 
is sufficient. Its evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact. 
The Appeals Court agreed with Mr. Sommer that coincidence 
is not proof of causation (Op. at p. 12), relying on Anica v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 120 Wn. App. 481,489, 84 P.3d 1231 (2004) (proximity 
in time between employee's return to work and termination did not 
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raise an inference of unlawful discrimination). The Appeals Court, 
however, ignored that proximity of events in time may support an 
inference of causation. Borden v. City of Olympia, 113 Wn. App. 
359, 372, 53 P.3d 1020 (2002) (evidence of a "coincidence" in time 
supports inference that drainage project proximately caused 
flooding); Bitzan v. Parisi, 88 Wn.2d 116, 118-122, 558 P.2d 775 
(1977) Oay testimony in personal injury action-including that, after 
a vehicle collision, upper back movement was limited-supported 
future damages instruction). 
H. The Appeals Court's Conclusion that Mr. Sommer's 
Interference with Life Designs' Business Expectancy 
was not by Improper Means Conflicts with 
Decisions of this Court and the Appeals Court that 
Interference may be Wrongful by Reason of a 
Recognized Rule of Common Law. 
"Interference can be 'wrongful' by reason of . . . a 
recognized rule of common law .... "Pleas v. City of Seattle, 112 
Wn.2d 794, 804, 774 P.2d 1158 (1989); Moore v. Commercial 
Aircraft Interiors, LLC, 168 Wn. App. 502, 510, 278 P.3d 197 
(2012). The Appeals Court concluded that use of an "Internet 
website" is not improper. (Op. at p. 16). However, interference by 
posting false statements to the Internet is wrongful by reason of the 
recognized common law rules of defamation. 
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I. The Appeals Court Decision Affirming the Trial 
Court's Dismissal of the Barrancos' False Light 
Invasion of Privacy Claim is in Conflict with 
Decisions of this Court and the Appeals Court. 
The Appeals Court affirmed dismissal of the Barrancos' false 
light invasion of privacy claim, reasoning that the evidence of 
damages only pertained to Life Designs, not the Barrancos 
individually. (Op. at p. 18). But as owners of Life Designs, damage 
to the Barrancos for invasion of privacy can take the form of decline 
in its business. See Brink v. Griffith, 65 Wn.2d 253, 258, 396 P.2d 
793 (1964) ("In defamation actions, the injured party is allowed to 
recover for emotional distress as well as injury to reputation, and 
vice versa in some actions for invasion of privacy"). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Life Designs respectfully requests that the Court grant review 
of the Appeals Court decision. 
Iff"' 
DATED this lLday of December, 2015. 
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PUBLISHED OPINION 
BROWN, A.C.J.- Life Designs Ranch (Life Designs) appeals the summary 
judgment dismissal of its defamation, tortious interference with a business expectancy, 
and invasion of privacy (false light) claims against Michael Sommer. Life Designs 
contends the trial court erred when it concluded Life Designs had failed to establish its 
legal claims as a matter of law. We disagree with Life Designs and affirm. 
FACTS 
Life Designs, owned by Vince and Bonnie Barranco, is a substance abuse 
aftercare program for young adults operating from Cusick, Washington with following 
optional transition housing in Spokane. Clients attend Narcotics Anonymous/Alcoholics 
Anonymous meetings at off-site locations three times a week as part of the program. 
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! 
l 
I 
No. 32922-4-111 
Life Designs Ranch v. Sommer 
The six-month Cusick program costs clients $52,200 plus a $1,200 initial interview fee. 
The Spokane transitional program costs an additional $12,000. 
Clay Garrett, formerly Life Designs' admissions director, developed relationships 
with educational consultants hired by the families of prospective clients to guide them in 
program selection. The educational consultants typically narrow the -prospective client's 
focus to three recommended programs. Mr. Garrett updated Life Designs' website to 
attract more clients. He often gave educational consultants and prospective clients Life 
Designs' website information so they could learn more about the program. 
In 2012, Mr. Sommer contracted to send his son to Life Designs. Mr. Sommer 
later disputed Life Designs' billings. Mr. Sommer e-mailed Mr. Barranco: 
Please review your contract again. It specifically states that any partial 
months are billed at full and the last month is not refundable. I think you 
are in a highly indefensible position. The 26K was put into brackets to 
show that was the amount we were at THE MOST liable for, not the least. 
I am willing to get legal with this. Are you? I would hope that the most 
important thing to you is your reputation. We all know how easily 
reputations can be destroyed, without the legal system even getting 
involved. But I would go both routes if I have to. You are wrong on all 
fronts. Please reconsider before we find it necessary to proceed. 
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 257. 
Mr. Sommer contacted one of Life Designs' referral sources, Chad Balagna, who 
worked at a preliminary treatment program. According to Mr. Sommer, he told Mr. 
Balagna he should "reconsider if he was going to recommend people there so his own 
reputation would be protected." CP at 243. It is unclear if Mr. Balagna is considered an 
educational consultant. Additionally, Mr. Sommer unsuccessfully complained to the 
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Better Business Bureau. He registered www.lifedesignsranchinc.com, a domain name 
similar to Life Designs' actual domain name, www.lifedesignsinc.com, Mr. Sommer 
uploaded and published allegedly defamatory content onto his website, partly including: 
• The problems with this organization are numerous. Life Designs 
Ranch claims to help you pursue your life's passions. That is only true 
if your life passion frts into what the other 11 prisoners and their 
wardens consider their life passion. 
• Therapeutic environment??? Only for the staff and the owner, Vince 
Barranco, who finds that charging 12 young adults $8000 to $9000 a 
months for food and housing permits him to pursue his life passions 
since he really doesn't have to work and has free labor to increase the 
value of his property. 
• What you get . .. A visual experience of pine trees, dead pine trees, 
falling down pine trees, disintegrated pine trees, and more pine trees. 
River, can't be seen. Mountains, can't be seen. Civilization, can't be 
seen. But there are pine trees!!!!! 
• What you get ... 2 or 3 twelve step meetings a week in a very small 
western Washington community where the only young adults in 
attendance are those from Life Designs ranch. 
• You should go to Life Designs if: ... You believe that it takes no 
education or experience with substance abuse, or compassion for the 
young adult who is recovering from a substance addiction to help them 
become the person they want to be. 
CP at 248-51. The "About Us" section on Mr. Sommer's website partly specified: 
"We are here to try to protect people from the financial and emotional distress 
that comes with attending Life Designs Ranch." CP at 251. It concluded: 
"Healing is not done and seems to be very limited in it's [sic] attempt. Keep your 
money, go somewhere else .... " ld. (emphasis added}. The website also 
included a link to Human Earth Animal Liberation's (HEAL) preexisting website 
alleging Life Designs is run like a cult, illegally exploits student labor, and 
employs a staff member who worked at another camp when a young boy died. 
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Life Designs sued Mr. Sommer for defamation, intrusion, false light, and 
interference with business expectancy based on later business losses. After the 
trial court dismissed its claims at summary judgment, Life Designs appealed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review summary judgment orders de novo, engaging in the same 
inquiry as the trial court. Mohr v. Grant, 153 Wn.2d 812, 821, 108 P .3d 768 
(2005). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, when viewed in a light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows no genuine issue of material fact 
remains and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 
56( c). "[C]onstruing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, the court asks whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of that party." 
Herron v. KING Broad. Co., 112 Wn.2d 762,767-68,776 P.2d 98 (1989). In 
defamation cases, summary judgment plays an important role: "Serious problems 
regarding the exercise of free speech and free press guaranteed by the First 
Amendment are raised if unwarranted lawsuits are allowed to proceed to trial. 
The chilling effect of the pendency of such litigation can itself be sufficient to 
curtail the exercise of these freedoms." Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wn.2d 473, 
485, 635 P.2d 1081 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ANALYSIS 
A. Defamation Per Se 
The issue is whether the trial court erred in failing to find, as a matter of law, Mr. 
Sommer's website was defamatory per se. Life Designs contends reasonable minds 
could solely conclude the false content on Mr. Sommer's website exposed it to hatred, 
contempt, ridicule, and obloquy, deprived it of public confidence, and injured its 
business. 
'Whether a given communication constitutes defamation per se may be either a 
question of law or a question of fact." Maison de France, Ltd. v. Mais Oui!, Inc., 126 
Wn. App. 34, 43, 108 P.3d 787 (2005). A publication is defamatory per se (actionable 
without proof of special damages) if it "(1) exposes a living person to hatred, contempt, 
ridicule or obloquy, or to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or social 
intercourse, or (2} injures him in his business, trade, profession or office." Caruso v. 
Local Union No. 690, 100Wn.2d 343, 353,670 P.2d 240 (1983). A jury normally 
decides what is defamatory per se: 
Where the definition of what is libelous per se goes far beyond the 
specifics of a charge of crime, or of unchastity in a woman, into the more 
nebulous area of what exposes a person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or 
obloquy, or deprives him of public confidence or social intercourse, the 
matter of what constitutes libel per se becomes, in many instances, a 
question of fact for the jury. 
/d. at 354 (quotation marks omitted). 
Life Designs argues Mr. Sommer's website directly attacks its recovery program 
business by denigrating its therapeutic environment and the staff's education, 
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experience, and compassion. But the website statements do not rise to the level of 
"extreme" need to constitute defamation per se as a matter of law. The criticized 
statements are similar to those seen in Caruso, dealing with "the rather vague areas of 
public confidence, injury to business, etc." /d. at 353. 
In Caruso, an article was printed in a weekly paper mailed to union members. /d. 
at 346. The article urged readers to avoid patronizing a carpet business because the 
business harassed laborers who, due to construction, parked at the business to make 
deliveries nearby. /d. The article further explained despite the laborers' willingness to 
move the equipment, the business still impounded the equipment. /d. This article was 
printed four times. /d. at 346-47. After its publication, people called the business, telling 
the owner they would not shop there. /d. at 347. Other callers used various derogatory 
and profane terms to refer to the owner. /d. Sales dropped sharply. ld. The court held 
the trial court improperly instructed the jury when it told the jury if the jury found the 
article was false and defamatory it was libelous per se. /d. at 353-54. Whether the 
article was defamatory per se was for the jury to decide. /d. 
Similarly, Mr. Sommer's website warned potential clients away from Life Designs. 
Life Designs' business declined shortly after publication. But unlike in Caruso, there 
were no threatening phone calls nor were there calls where people said they would not 
send their family member/client to Life Designs. Given Caruso, we conclude the less 
severe publication here cannot be defamation per seas a matter of law. 
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B. Defamation 
The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing Life Designs' defamation 
claim. Life Designs contends: (1) the contents of Mr. Sommer's website are actionable 
statements of false fact resulting in damage to Life Designs and (2) Mr. Sommer 
republished allegedly defamatory material by hyperlinking the HEAL website. 
Life Designs must raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the four elements 
of a prima facie defamation claim by establishing: (1) Mr. Sommer's statements were 
false, (2) the statements were unprivileged, (3) Mr. Sommer was at fault, and (4) the 
statements proximately caused damages. Alpine Indus. Computers, Inc. v. Cowles 
Publ'g Co., 114 Wn. App. 371, 378, 57 P.3d 1178 (2002). Here, elements (1) and (4) 
are contested. "The prima facie case must consist of specific, material facts, rather than 
conclusory statements, that would allow a jury to find that each element of defamation 
exists." /d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The alleged defamatory statement must be a statement of fact, not a statement 
of opinion. Davis v. Fred's Appliance, Inc., 171 Wn. App. 348, 365, 287 P.3d 51 (2012). 
As the line between fact and opinion "is sometimes blurry," we consider the following 
factors to determine whether a statement is actionable: "'(1) the medium and context in 
which the statement was published, (2) the audience to whom it was published, and (3) 
whether the statement implies undisclosed facts."' /d. (quoting Dunlap v. Wayne, 105 
Wn.2d 529, 539, 716 P.2d 842 (1986)). Regarding the first factor, the Dunlap court 
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noted statements expressing opinion are found more often in certain contexts. Dunlap, 
105 Wn.2d at 539. "The court should consider the entire communication and note 
whether the speaker qualified the defamatory statement with cautionary terms of 
apparency." /d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
All allegedly defamatory statements were published on Mr. Sommer's website, 
the medium. In this realm, a dearth of Washington defamation law exists. While other 
jurisdictions have found statements on similar "spoof' websites can survive a motion for 
summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, no case has held the existence of such a 
"spoof' website automatically means the statements on the website are actionable. See 
Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 507 F. Supp. 2d 832, 838-40 (S.D. Ohio 2007) 
(individually analyzing statements on a "spoor website to determine whether they are 
actionable); Winerv. Senior Living Guide, Inc., No. 12-934, 2013 WL 1217582 (W.O. 
Pa. 2013) (denying motion to dismiss where the "spoor website contained untrue 
factual statements and falsely indicated it was the plaintiffs official website). 
Mr. Sommer did not attempt to pass his website off as Life Designs' official 
website; the "About Us" section is clear, using "seems" as a word of apparency. 
Dunlap, 105 Wn.2d at 539; CP at 251. Thus the website suggested opinions, not facts. 
Furthermore, Mr. Sommer's website did provide a hyperlink to Life Designs' official 
website and expressly said that the link was to "the website for Life Designs Ranch." 
CP at 250. From a policy standpoint, allowing businesses to sue any unhappy 
consumer for what they posted online for defamation would stifle freedom of speech. 
8 
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The internet is a medium where statements expressing opinions in the context of 
reviewing businesses and services are often found. The medium and context of Mr. 
Sommer's website denotes it is opining about the quality of Life Designs' business, 
especially when looked at in relation to the other two factors discussed next. 
For the second factor, courts should consider "whether the audience expected 
the speaker to use exaggeration, rhetoric, or hyperbole." Dunlap, 105 Wn.2d at 539. 
Here, the audience was the people researching Life Designs. Online search engines 
retrieved many results for Life Designs; the first result was Life Designs' official website, 
the fourth result was Mr. Sommer's website, and the fifth result was the HEAL website. 
The blurb describing Mr. Sommer's website read, "Thinking about going to or sending 
someone you love to Life Designs Ranch?? Read this first." CP at 60. This language 
signaled this was a review and not the official website of Life Deslgns. 
The third factor is "perhaps [the] most crucial" as "[a]rguments for actionability 
disappear when the audience members know the facts underlying an assertion and can 
judge the truthfulness of the allegedly defamatory statements themselves." Dunlap, 105 
Wn.2d at 539-40; see Davis, 171 Wn. App. at 366 (stating the third factor "addresses 
whether a listener unknown to the plaintiff can judge the truthfulness of the statement"). 
"Whether a statement is one of fact or opinion is a question of law unless the statement 
could only be characterized as either fact or opinion." Davis, 171 Wn. App. at 365. Life 
Designs discusses three statements in its briefing. 
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The first criticized statement is: "What you get .... 2 or 3 twelve step meetings 
a week in a very small western Washington community where the only young adults in 
attendance are those from Life Designs ranch." CP at 248. While Mr. Sommer 
incorrectly described Life Designs as being located in western Washington, this 
statement was not based on undisclosed facts. Rather, Life Designs' official website 
states it is located in Cusick, Washington, which is on the eastern side of the state. 
The second statement, "What you get . . . . A visual experience of pine trees, 
dead pine trees, falling down pine trees, disintegrated pine trees, and more pine trees. 
River, can't be seen. Mountains, can't be seen. Civilization, can't be seen. But there 
are pine trees!!!!!" CP at 248. On its website, Life Designs disclosed it is located "on 30 
acres overlooking the Pend O'reille River on the international Selkirk Scenic Loop" and 
the "area boasts a reputation for one of the most undiscovered recreational areas in the 
northwest." Life Designs Ranch, http://www.lifedesignsinc.com (last visited Sept. 9, 
2015). The website shows pictures of clients in Life Designs' natural setting. /d. 
The third statement is "Who Should Go? You should go to Life Designs if: 
... You believe that it takes no education or experience with substance abuse, or 
compassion for the young adult who is recovering from a substance addiction to help 
them become the person they want to be." CP at 249. Again, this statement is based 
on disclosed facts. Life Designs' website discusses the experience and education of its 
staff. While the compassion of the staff is not directly addressed on Life Designs' 
website, compassion is a subjective determination and is thus opinion. 
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Each Dunlap factor weighs in Mr. Sommer's favor. Given all, Mr. Sommer's 
statements were nonactionable as defamation. Even if actionable, Life Designs fails to 
make a sufficient showing Mr. Sommer's statements proximately caused its damages.1 
The sparse evidence shows (1) a decline in referrals following publication of Mr. 
Sommer's website despite an increase in traffic to Life Designs' official website, (2) 
some hearsay by Mr. Garrett about an interaction between Mr. Sommer and Mr. 
Balagna regarding not making referrals to Life Designs, and (3) no other apparent 
changes accounting for the referral decline. Mr. Garrett's declaration opining Mr. 
Sommer's website caused the decline in referrals is conclusory. Mr. Garrett limited his 
analysis to Life Designs' official website. No evidence shows anyone who visited Life 
Designs' website visited or was influenced by Mr. Sommer's website. Life Designs has 
1 Mr. Sommer contends Mr. Garrett's declaration is inadmissible as an expert 
opinion because (1) Mr. Garrett was not qualified to offer the opinions contained therein, 
thus (2) much of the declaration was inadmissible conclusory allegations of a lay 
witness. We cannot consider inadmissible evidence when ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment. Davis, 171 Wn. App. at 357. We review the admissibility of 
evidence in summary judgment proceedings de novo. /d. ER 702 states: "If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise." Under this rule, we engage in a two-part inquiry: "(1) does the witness 
qualify as an expert; and (2) would the witness's testimony be helpful to the trier of fact." 
State v. Guillot, 106 Wn. App. 355, 363, 22 P.3d 1266 (2001). The focus of our inquiry 
is on Mr. Garrett's qualifications. "[l]n the appropriate context, practical experience is 
sufficient to qualify a witness as an expert." State v. McPherson, 111 Wn. App. 747, 
762, 46 P.3d 284 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once a witness is qualified 
as an expert, any deficiencies in that qualification go to the weight, not the admissibility 
of the testimony. Keegan v. Grant County Pub. Uti/. Dist. No. 2, 34 Wn. App. 274, 283, 
661 P.2d 146 (1983). Mr. Garrett's experience in wilderness programs, computers 
(including building a website), and business development render his testimony 
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not referred to or produced anyone who did not choose Life Designs because of Mr. 
Sommer's website. And while Life Designs can show Mr. Sommer talked to Mr. 
Balagna about not referring anyone to Life Designs, no evidence shows Mr. Balagna 
took Mr. Sommer's advice and stopped referring clients. 
Mr. Sommer argues coincidence is not proof of causation. See Anica v. Waf-
Mart Stores, Inc., 120Wn. App. 481,489,84 P.3d 1231 (2004) (stating employee's 
argument that timing of her termination gave rise to a reasonable inference of unlawful 
discrimination relied on a logical fallacy-"after this, therefore because of this"). Life 
Designs cites to Borden v. City of Olympia, 113 Wn. App. 359, 53 P.3d 1029 (2002), to 
show coincidence in timing can give rise to an inference the result was the proximate 
cause of the action. There are two defects in Life Designs' analogy. First, Borden was 
not a defamation case. In defamation cases, it has been held in a summary judgment 
context, absent a privileged defendant, a private individual must prove negligence by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Momah v. Bharti, 144 Wn. App. 731, 742, 182 P.3d 
455 (2008); see Mohr, 153 Wn.2d at 822. Second, the evidence used regarding 
coincidence in timing was quite different. In Borden, flooding started the first winter 
after the drainage project was completed and recurred each winter for several years. 
Borden, 113 Wn. App. at 372. The flooding subsided when another drainage facility 
channelled water out of the area. /d. The evidence submitted by Life Designs does not 
meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. 
admissible under ER 702. Any deficiencies in his testimony thus would go to the 
weight. 
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Next, Life Designs contends publishing the hyperlink to an allegedly defamatory 
website alone constitutes republication of that defamatory content to third persons 
reading Mr. Sommer's website. No Washington case addresses this contention. 
Washington has adopted the single publication rule which "states that any one 
edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio or television broadcast, is a single 
publication." Momah, 144 Wn. App. at 752 (internal quotation marks omitted). Momah 
is the sole Washington case exploring application of this rule to the internet. There, a 
newspaper published comments attributed to the defendant. /d. at 737. Another article 
was later published, again quoting the defendant. /d. At some point, the defendant 
posted the newspaper articles to his website. /d. In holding the defendant republished 
the defamatory material, the court reiterated "the general rule that each communication 
of the same defamatory matter by the same defamer, whether to a new person or to the 
same person, is a separate and distinct publication, for which a separate cause of 
action arises." /d. at 753 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court held the 
defendant made the statement two different times, once when he spoke to the 
newspaper and once when he posted the articles on his website. /d. The two 
publications were aimed at different audiences. /d. The court found the situation did 
not differ from a newscast reading the same copy at 5:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. /d. 
While no Washington law is directly on point, a federal court grappling with this 
same issue used Washington law to hold "a mere reference or URL [Uniform Resource 
Locator) is not a publication of the contents of the materials referred to." U.S. ex. rei. 
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Klein v. Omeros Corp., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1074 (W.O. Wash. 2012). The Klein 
court distinguished relevant Washington case law, including Momah, by stating "a 
finding of republication hinged on the defendant's communication of the contents of the 
original, allegedly defamatory statements." /d. Because the defendant in Klein merely 
provided a URL to such statements, no republication of the contents existed. /d. 
Other courts considering the issue are in accord with Klein. In Salyer v. S . 
Poverty Law Center, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 912, 916 (W.O. Ky. 2009), the court 
observed: 
It appears that the common thread of traditional republication is that it 
presents the material, in its entirety, before a new audience. A mere 
reference to a previously published article does not do that. While it may 
call the existence of the article to the attention of a new audience, it does 
not present the defamatory contents of the article to that audience. 
Therefore, a reference, without more, is not properly a republication. 
Because a hyperlink is more like a reference than a separate publication, "[m]aking 
access to the referenced article easier does not appear to warrant a different conclusion 
from the analysis of a basic reference." /d. at 917; see also In re Philadelphia 
Newspapers, 690 F.3d 161, 175 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding "though a link and reference 
may bring readers' attention to the existence of an article, they do not republish the 
article"). 
We are persuaded by Klein and Salyer. We reason a URL is not qualitatively 
different from a mere reference. Therefore, we hold Mr. Sommer did not republish 
allegedly defamatory material when he posted on his website: "For more info click or cut 
and paste the link below http://www.heal-online.org/lifedesigns.htm." CP at 249. 
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C. Tortious Interference with a Business Expectancy 
The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing Life Designs' claim for 
tortious interference with a business expectancy. The five elements of a tortious 
interference with a business expectancy are: "(1) the existence of a valid ... business 
expectancy; (2) that defendants had knowledge of that [expectancy]; (3) an intentional 
interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the ... expectancy; (4) that 
defendants interfered for an improper purpose or used improper means; and (5) 
resultant damage." Leingang v. Pierce County Med. Bureau, 131 Wn.2d 133, 157, 930 
P.2d 288 (1997). The first, third, fourth, and fifth elements are at issue here. 
"A valid business expectancy includes any prospective contractual or business 
relationship that would be of pecuniary value." Newton Ins. Agency & Brokerage, Inc. v. 
Caledonian Ins. Grp., Inc., 114 Wn. App. 151, 158, 52 P .3d 30 (2002). A plaintiff must 
show future business opportunities "are a reasonable expectation and not merely 
wishful thinking," but certainty of proof is not needed. Caruso v. Local Union No. 690, 
33 Wn. App. 201, 208, 653 P.2d 638 (1982}, rev'd on other grounds, 100 Wn.2d 343 
(1983). Life Designs used its historical referral and enrollment records to demonstrate it 
could reasonably (1) expect a certain number of referrals each quarter and (2) 
successfully enroll a specific percentage of those referrals as clients. Thus, Life 
Designs raised a prima facie business expectancy. 
Next, interference with a business expectancy is intentional "if the actor desires 
to bring it about or if he knows that the interference is certain or substantially certain to 
15 
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occur as a result of his action." Newton Ins. Agency & Brokerage, Inc., 114 Wn. App. at 
158 (internal quotation marks omitted). Looking at the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Life Designs, Mr. Sommer intentionally interfered with a business 
expectancy. Mr. Sommer acquired a domain name similar to that of Life Designs' 
official website because he wanted people to see his website when searching for Life 
Designs. Mr. Sommer wanted people to research and question Life Designs' program. 
Mr. Sommer admitted telling Mr. Balagna he should not refer clients to Life Designs. 
In evaluating the fourth element, a plaintiff must establish the intentional 
interference was wrongful. Pleas v. City of Seattle, 112 Wn.2d 794, 804, 77 4 P .2d 1158 
(1989). Interference is wrongful if it is done for an improper purpose or by improper 
means. /d. In Pleas, the city of Seattle intentionally stalled development of a high-rise 
apartment complex. The improper motive was a desire to curry favor with the active 
and influential opponents of the project; the improper means was the city's arbitrary 
refusal to grant necessary permits. /d. at 804-05. The means used by Mr. Sommer, the 
internet website, was not improper. But looking at the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Life Designs, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Mr. 
Sommer acted with an improper purpose as he threatened to destroy Life Designs' 
reputation in an e-mail. 
Decisive is the fifth element. Life Designs fails to show resultant damage to its 
business expectancy. The trial court did not err in dismissing this claim because Life 
Designs' conclusory claim of injury to reputation lacks evidentiary support. No client, 
16 
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potential client, or referral source submitted an affidavit establishing they can no longer 
trust Life Designs or did not choose Life Designs because of Mr. Sommer's website. 
D. False Light 
The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing Life Designs' false light 
claim. Life Designs contends Mr. Sommer's website placed the Barrancos in a false 
light because the contents of the website created a false impression about the way in 
which the Barrancos operated their business. 
"The protectable interest in privacy is generally held to involve four distinct types 
of invasion: intrusion, disclosure, false light and appropriation." Eastwood v. Cascade 
Broad. Co., 106 Wn.2d 466, 469, 722 P.2d 1295 (1986) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Actions based on invasion of privacy are separate and distinct from those 
based on defamation. /d. False light claims differ from defamation claims because 
false light claims focus on compensation for mental suffering rather than reputation. /d. 
at 471. Washington follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 
90 Wn.2d 123, 135, 580 P.2d 246 (1978) (establishing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
ToRTS§ 652D (1977) sets out the guiding principles for invasion of privacy actions). 
Only a living individual whose privacy has been invaded can maintain an action 
for invasion of privacy. RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521. Comment (c) to the 
Restatement states a corporation has no personal right of privacy and thus has no 
cause of action for invasion of privacy. Thus, Life Designs' false light claim fails. But 
the Barrancos individually sued for false light and do not face the corporate exclusion. 
17 
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A false light claim arises when someone publicizes a matter that places 
another in a false light if (a) the false light would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person and (b) the actor knew of or recklessly disregarded the 
falsity of the publication and the false light in which the other would be 
placed. 
Eastwood, 106 Wn.2d at 470-71 (internal quotation marks omitted). While the 
Barrancos' false light claim may have merit, all evidence in relation to damages is in 
reference to Life Designs. Ms. Barranco was not mentioned by name on Mr. Sommer's 
website; her claim is derivative of Mr. Barranco's claim. Mr. Barranco did not state he 
personally suffered damage to his reputation or any emotional suffering; rather, all his 
statements refer to the damages suffered by his business, Life Designs. Thus, the trial 
court did not err in dismissing the false light claims. 
Affirmed. 
Brown, A.C.J. 
I CONCUR: 
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FEARING, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part) -1 conclude that plaintiff 
Life Designs Ranch, Inc. (Life Designs) presents sufficient facts to survive a summary 
judgment motion on its claims of defamation and tortious interference with business 
expectancy. Thus, I, in part, respectfully dissent from the majority. I concur with the 
majority's ruling that Life Designs may not recover against Michael Sommer because of 
a hyperlink on his website to another site critical of Life Designs. I also concur that Life 
Designs and Vincent and Bobbie Barranco cannot recover in false light. 
The majority comm·its three fundamental errors that lead to my partial dissent. 
First, the majority mistakenly fabricates a new element of"extreme defamation" for 
defamation per se. Second, the majority mistakenly levies a higher standard of proof, not 
imposed in other actions, for causation in.defamation and tortious interference with 
business expectancy actions. Third, the majority also weighs facts on the issue of 
damages. 
The majority retells the basic facts of the dispute. The facts include quotes of the 
alleged defamatory statements published by defendant Michael Sommer about Life 
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Designs. I will emphasize some of the basic facts when I discuss the respective claims 
asserted by Life Designs. 
DEFAMATION PER SE 
I do not know if defamation per se is a cause of action distinct from defamation, 
but I analyze the former separately from the latter. Life Designs does not allege 
defamation per se as a separate cause of action but has consistently argued defamation 
per se as a basis for recovery. Defamation per se loosens for the plaintiff the burden of 
proving damages. If a plaintiff shows defamation per se, the law presumes damages. 
Maison de France, Ltd. v. Mais Oui!, Inc., 126 Wn. App. 34, 53-54, 108 P.3d 787 (2005). 
Stated differently, plaintiff need not prove loss of income or special damages to recover. 
Since the trial court dismissed Life Designs' defamation claim because of a failure to 
show damages, whether Life Designs creates an issue of fact as to defamation per se 
looms important. To intelligently analyze defamation per se, I must first include a 
discussion of the elements of defamation. 
The common law distinguished between libel, written or printed defamatory 
words, and slander, spoken defamatory words. Washington no longer distinguishes 
between libel and slander, such that Washington law only recognizes a cause of action for 
defamation. 
The law of defamation embodies the public policy that individuals should be free 
to enjoy their reputations unimpaired by false and defamatory attacks. Maressa v. New 
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Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176,445 A.2d 376,383 (1982); Campos v. Oldsmobile Div., 
Gen. Motors Corp., 71 Mich. App. 23,246 N.W.2d 352,354 (1976); 50 Am. Jur. 2d 
Libel and Slander § 2 (20 15). Decisions of the United States Supreme Court recognize 
the important societal interest in the protection of individual reputations, despite First 
Amendment protections for free speech. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169, 99 S. Ct. 
1635, 60 L. Ed. 2d 115 ( 1979); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 3 76 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. 
Ed. 2d 686 ( 1964 ). Defamation is an impairment of a relational interest; it denigrates the 
opinion which others in the community have of the plaintiff and invades the plaintiffs 
interest in his or her reputation and good name. Lumbermen 's Mut. Cas. Co. v. United 
Services Auto Ass'n, 218 N.J. Super. 492, 528 A.2d 64, 67 (App. Div. 1987); 50 Am. Jur. 
2d Libel and Slander§ 2 (2015). One's reputation can greatly impact one's business and 
income. Washington courts generally deny that the state's civil law seeks to punish, but 
one Supreme Court decision exclaimed that the purpose of defamation law is to punish 
the publisher, since there is no constitutional protection for a false, damaging statement. 
Due Tan v. Le, 177 Wn.2d 649, 666, 300 P.3d 356 (20 13). 
Washington decisions characterize defamation as consisting of four elements: (1) a 
false statement, (2) publication, (3) fault, and ( 4) damages. Due Tan v. Le, 177 Wn.2d at 
662 (2013); Herron v. KING Broad. Co., 112 Wn.2d 762, 768,776 P.2d 98 (1989). 
Some cases substitute the element of unprivileged communication for publication. 
Grange Ins. Ass'n v. Roberts, 179 Wn. App. 739,767,320 P.3d 77 (2013), review 
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denied, 180 Wn. 2d 1026,328 P.3d 903 (2014); Demopolis v. Peoples Nat'/ Bank of 
Wash., 59 Wn. App. 105, 108,796 P.2d 426 (1990). The traditional four elements can be 
dissected into a lengthier list that includes: 
l. a statement; 
2. factual in character rather than an opinion; 
3. defamatory in nature; 
4. and false; 
5. concerning the plaintiff; 
6. communicated to a third party; 
7. without an absolute or conditional privilege to so communicate; 
8. with a varying degree of fault on the part of the defendant depending on the 
nature of the plaintiff and the statement; 
9. and which causes; 
10. damages. 
Former Court of Appeals Judge Dean Morgan wrote an opinion in Schmalenberg v. 
Tacoma News, Inc., 87 Wn. App. 579, 943 P.2d 350 (1997), in the nature of a law review 
article, that meticulously explains the history behind the defamation action and the 
permutations in its elements. 
I return to defamation per se. Michael Sommer contends that defamation per se 
applies solely to statements accusing the plaintiff of unchaste or criminal conduct. 
Sommer cites Davis v. Fred's Appliance, Inc., 171 Wn. App. 348, 367, 287 PJd 51, 61 
(2012) for this proposition. Davis at page 367 does read that: "defamation per se 
generally requires imputation of a crime or communicable disease.'' (Emphasis added). 
The quotation does not read that defamation per se always necessitates attribution of 
crime or communicable disease. Davis cites a Florida and an Ohio case for its 
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proposition. 
No Washington decision expressly limits defamation per se to crime and 
infectious disease. Instead, oodles of decisions extend defamation per se well beyond 
accusations of disease and criminal behavior. A statement is defamatory per se if it ( 1) 
exposes a living person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or to deprive him of the 
benefit of public confidence or social intercourse, or (2) injures him in his business, trade, 
profession or office. Caruso v. Local Union No. 690 oflnt'l Bhd. ofTeamsters, 100 
Wn.2d 343, 353,670 P.2d 240 (1983); Amsbury v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 76 Wn.2d 733, 
737, 458 P.2d 882 (1969); Grayson v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 72 Wn.2d 999,436 P.2d 756 
(1967); Purvis v. Bremer's, Inc., 54 Wn.2d 743,751, 344 P.2d 705 (1959); Spangler v. 
Glover, 50 Wn.2d 473, 313 P.2d 354 (1957); Wood v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist., 107 Wn. 
App. 550, 573-74, 27 P.3d 1208 (2001); Maison de France, Ltd. v. Mais Oui!, Inc., 126 
Wn. App. 34 (2005); Haueter v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 61 Wn. App. 572,578, 811 P.2d 231 
(1991); Vern Sims Ford, Inc. v. Hagel, 42 Wn. App. 675,679,713 P.2d 736 (1986); 
Corbin v. Madison, 12 Wn. App. 318,529 P.2d 1145 (1974). Defamatory words spoken 
of a person, which themselves prejudice him in his profession, trade, vocation, or office, 
are slanderous and actionable per se. Ward v. Painters' Local Union No. 300, 41 Wn.2d 
859, 863,252 P.2d 253 (1953); Maison de France, Ltd. v. Mais Qui!, Inc., 126 Wn. App. 
at 45 n.1 (2005); Waechter v. Carnation Co., 5 Wn. App. 121, 126,485 P.2d 1000 
( 1971 ). A publication is also defamatory per se if it imputes to the plaintiff conduct 
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involving moral turpitude. Maison de France, Ltd. v. Mais Oui!, Inc., 126 Wn. App. 34 
(2005); Wardv. Painters' Local Union No. 300,41 Wn.2d at 863. 
The list of categories mentioned by Washington courts as comprising defamation 
per se may cover all defamatory statements such that all defamatory statements could be 
judged defamation per se, particularly since the object behind the tort is to protect one's 
public confidence and the goal of the tort is to guard one's personality from contempt and 
ridicule. I need not explore the limits, however, of defamation per se, since facts support 
a conclusion that Michael Sommer's website deprived Life Designs of the benefit of 
public confidence and injured the business and trade of the addiction recovery center. 
The majority impliedly holds that a defamatory statement must be "extreme" in 
order to qualify as defamatory per se. Majority Op. at 6. No Washington decision 
supports this holding. The adjective "extreme" arises from our high court's decision in 
Caruso v. Local Union No. 690 of lnt'l Bhd. of Teamsters. The Supreme Court wrote: 
The imputation of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude has 
been held to be clearly libelous per se. [Ward v. Painters' Local 300], 41 
Wn.2d 859,252 P.2d 253 (1953). The instant case is quite different. It 
deals with the rather vague areas of public confidence, injury to business, 
etc. In such cases 
Where the definition of what is libelous per se goes far 
beyond the specifics of a charge of crime, or of unchastity in 
a woman, into the more nebulous area of what exposes a 
person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or deprives 
him of public confidence or social intercourse, the matter of 
what constitutes libel per se becomes, in many instances, a 
question of fact for the jury. 
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Purvis v. Bremer's, Inc., 54 Wn.2d 743, 752, 344 P.2d 705 (1959). In all 
but extreme cases the jury should determine whether the article was 
libelous per se. Miller v. Argus Publ'g Co., 79 Wn.2d 816, 820 n.3, 821 
n.4, 490 P .2d 101 (1971 ); Amsbury v. Cowles Pub/ 'g Co., supra [76 Wn.2d 
at 740]. 
Caruso v. Local Union, 100 Wn.2d at 353-54. (Emphasis added). Note that the 
quotation demands that the jury determine whether a statement is defamatory per se 
except in extreme cases. The excerpt does not command an extreme case before a judge 
or jury may declare the statement defamatory per se. Later decisions read th~ Caruso 
quote as declaring that a determination of whether a statement is defamatory per se is for 
the court, not the jury, unless the claim involves the vague areas of public confidence or 
injury to business. Woodv. Battle Ground Sch. Dist., 107 Wn. App. at 574 (2001). Life 
Designs does not seek a ruling on appeal as a matter oflaw that Michael Sommer's 
website constituted defamation per se. Life Designs settles for sending the claim of 
defamation per se to a jury . 
The majority's holding that only "extreme" cases qualify for defamation per se 
will create difficulties for practitioners and lower courts. The majority gives little, if any, 
guidance, as to what circumstances qualify as "extreme" cases. Lawyers and trial courts 
may wonder if they look to principles adopted in intentional infliction of emotional 
distress decisions to determine when conduct of a defendant constitutes outrage. In such 
a setting, the plaintiff must establish "extreme" conduct. Trujillo v. Nw. Trustee Servs., 
Inc., 183 Wn.2d 820, 840,355 P.3d 1100 (2015). 
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In Caruso v. Local Union, the defendant union published a "do not patronize" 
article in its weekly paper. The article read: 
Don't [P]atronize Carpet City in Spokane 
This is to notify all members of Teamsters Union, Local690 and all 
other Teamsters and Laboring people in the State of Washington that when 
traveling to and from the Expo City-"please do not patronize Carpet City 
Carpet & Linoleum Shop at West 518 Main Avenue"-Spokane, 
Washington," [sic] (Expo City). The reasons for this request are: This 
Company is continuously harassing the Teamsters and other laboring 
people who may at some time use the parking facility at this place of 
business to make a delivery because of the congested traffic problems in 
Expo City since construction is going on mainly in that area. Someone 
from this Company removes the keys of such vehicles, have [sic] the 
equipment impounded and create [sic] many problems for these employees 
and their employers including the cost of impoundment to those effected 
[sic]. 
This company will not cooperate with these drivers when told that 
they will move their equipment and apologize for parking in this area-
their equipment is still impounded! 
We request that all Laboring people-Teamsters or otherwise-do 
not [p]atronize Carpet City Carpet & Linoleum Shop. 
Thanks kindly for your Support. 
Teamsters Union, Local690. 
Caruso, 100 Wn.2d at 346. Facts belied the allegations regarding the carpet business' 
lack of cooperation and impoundment of vehicles after an apology. Contrary to this 
court's majority's analysis, the Caruso court did not declare a jury instruction erroneous 
because it directed the jury to find the paper's article to be defamatory per se if it found 
the article to be false. The court found the instruction mistaken because it allowed the 
jury to presume damages without a finding of malice, a ruling that is no longer accepted 
law. 
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The majority in this appeal emphasizes threatening phone calls placed to Robert 
Caruso after the union's publication and distinguishes the case on appeal with Caruso v. 
Local Union on the basis that Life Designs received no phone calls or threatening 
messages. Nevertheless, the threatening phone calls were relevant to the damages 
sustained by Caruso, not to the liability of the union. The reader's response to a 
defamatory statement has no bearing on whether the statement is defamation per se. 
Caruso does not read to the contrary. 
At least three Washington decisions illustrate that Michael Sommer's website 
entries qualify for defamation per se. In Wood v. Battle Ground School District, 107 Wn. 
App. 550 (2001), this court reversed a summary judgment dismissal of a defamation 
claim brought by a former employee of the school district against the district board chair. 
The chairman told a local newspaper that Jennifer Wood's performance as a 
communications coordinator was "lacking." The court characterized the quotation as 
defamatory per se. 
In Vern Sims Ford, Inc. v. Hagel, 42 Wn. App. 675 (1986), Fred Hagel claimed 
the Ford dealership overcharged him for the purchase of a van. Hagel sent a flyer to 
approximately one hundred persons in the dealership's community. The flyer read that 
the dealership and its salesperson were thieves. The trial court awarded damages despite 
no proof of actual damages since the flyer injured the dealership's business reputation. 
This court agreed the flyer constituted defamation per se and affirmed the award. 
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In Waechter v. Carnation Co., 5 Wn. App. 121 (1971), a competitor in milk 
delivery told customers in the community that the plaintiffs milk was not properly 
refrigerated and therefore contained bacteria injurious to the drinker's health. This court 
sustained a substantial award despite missing proof of actual damages because the nature 
of the defamatory statement was defamatory per se. 
FALSITY, FACT, AND OPINION 
I must now determine whether Life Designs presents some evidence of all of the 
elements of defamation, regardless of whether Michael Sommer's comments were 
defamatory per se. Irrespective of whether the defendant's statements affect the 
plaintiffs business, the plaintiff must still fulfill the elements of defamation. The 
majority holds that all remarks on Sommer's website were opinion, not factual, in 
personality. The majority also holds that Life Designs failed to provide evidence of 
damages. I address now whether some evidence supports a conclusion that remarks on 
Sommers' website were factually false. I will later address damages. 
Consistent with the majority's ruling, Michael Sommer argues that the contents of 
his website entirely entail mockery, exaggeration, vituperation, and complaints over 
pricing and the quality of services received. Sommer asks that this court rule as a matter 
of law that written grievances from a dissatisfied customer complaining of overcharges 
and poor service is protected and not defamatory. When Sommer contends that his 
comments were not defamatory he does not contend that his statements were not negative 
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or hurtful to Life Designs. In other words, he does not argue that the meaning of the 
words was not defamatory, but he argues instead that his comments were in the nature of 
opinions and thus not qualifying as defamation. Sommer mentions in passing that an 
element of defamation is a defamatory statement, but Sommer does not expressly adopt 
the position that any particular statement could not injure Life Designs' reputation. 
Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial 
consideration. West v. Thurston County, 168 Wn. App. 162, 187, 275 P.3d 1200 (2012); 
Holland v. City of Tacoma, 90 Wn. App. 533, 538, 954 P .2d 290 (1998). 
At the outset, the defamation plaintiff must prove the offensive statement is 
"provably false." Alpine Indus. Computers, Inc. v. Cowles Pub/ 'g Co., 114 Wn. App. 
371,379, 57 P.3d 1178 (2002), 64 P.3d 49 (2003); Schmalenberg v. Tacoma News, Inc., 
87 Wn. App. at 590 ( 1997). A statement can be provably false if it falsely describes the 
act, condition or event that comprises its subject matter. Schmalenberg, 87 Wn. App. at 
590. Implications, like plain statements, may give rise to a defamation claim. Mohr v. 
Grant, 153 Wn.2d 812, 823, 108 P.3d 768 (2005). In a defamation by implication case, 
the plaintiff must show that the statement at issue is provably false, either because it is a 
false statement or because it leaves a false impression. Sisley v. Seattle Pub. Sch., 180 
Wn. App. 83, 87-88, 321 P.3d 276 (2014). 
Defamation law distinguishes between fact and opinion. While communication of 
a false fact may not be privileged, expressions of opinion are protected under the First 
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Amendment and thus are not actionable. Carner v. Seattle Post-lntel/igencer, 45 Wn. 
App. 29, 39, 723 P.2d 1195 (1986). 
Certain means of expression qualify as opinion. "Rhetorical hyperbole" is not 
actionable as defamation and is constitutionally protected. Haueter v. Cowles Pub/ 'g 
Co., 61 Wn. App. 572, 586 (1991). Some statements cannot reasonably be understood to 
be meant literally and seriously and are obviously mere vituperation and abuse. Robel v. 
Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 55, 59 PJd 611 (2002), (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS§ 566 cmt. e (1977)). 
The law treats some ostensible opinions as facts and actionable in defamation. A 
defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, and a 
statement of this nature is actionable if it implies the allegation of undisclosed 
defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion. Carner, 45 Wn. App. at 39 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 at 170 (1977)). A statement meets the 
provably false test to the extent it expresses or implies provable facts, regardless of 
whether the statement is, in form, a statement of fact or a statement of opinion. Valdez-
Zontak v. Eastmont Sch. Dist., 154 Wn. App. 147,225 P.3d 339 (2010). If a direct 
statement of facts would be defamatory, then a statement of an opinion implying the 
existence of those false facts supports a defamation action. Henderson v. Pennwalt 
Corp., 41 Wn. App. 547, 557,704 P.2d 1256 (1985). 
The determination of whether a communication is one of fact or opinion is a 
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question of law for the court. Benjamin v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 37 Wn. App. 916,922, 
684 P.2d 739 (1984). Washington courts have promulgated two complimentary tests to 
aid a court in making this determination. Under the first test, the court should consider: 
(1) the entire article and not merely a particular phrase or sentence, (2) the degree to 
which the truth or falsity of a statement can be objectively determined without resort to 
speculation, and (3) whether ordinary persons hearing or reading the matter perceive the 
statement as an expression of opinion rather than a statement of fact. Benjamin, 37 Wn. 
App. at 923; Carner, 45 Wn. App. at 39. Even apparent statements of fact may assume 
the character of opinions, and thus be privileged, when made in public debate, heated 
labor dispute, or other circumstances in which an audience may anticipate efforts by the 
parties to persuade others to their positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole. 
Carner v. Seattle Post-lntelligencer, 45 Wn. App. at 41 (1986). In other words, both the 
immediate as well as broader social context in which the statements occur should be 
considered. Carner, 45 Wn. App. at 41. 
Under the second test, to determine whether the words are nonactionable opinions, 
the court considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements. Robel v. 
Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d at 55 (2002). The court studies (1) the medium and context 
in which the statement was published, (2) the audience to whom it was published, and (3) 
whether the statement implies [defamatory] undisclosed facts. Durzlap v. Wayne, 105 
Wn.2d 529,539,716 P.2d 842 (1986); Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d at 55. 
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Michael Sommer argues that Robel v. Roundup Corporation is dispositive in his 
favor. Linda Robel, an employee of defendant, filed a worker compensation claim. 
Thereafter imaginative coworkers called Robel pleasantries such as "bitch," "cunt," 
"fucking bitch," "fucking cunt," "snitch," "squealer," "liar," and "idiot." 128 Wn.2d at 
55 (2002). The Supreme Court concluded that, under the circumstances in which the 
coemployees uttered the names, the words were plainly abusive words not intended to be 
taken literally as statements of fact. The court applied the Dunlap three-factor test. At 
issue were oral statements made in circumstances and places that invited exaggeration 
and personal opinion. Those engaging in the name-calling were Robel's coworkers and 
superiors who were potentially interested in discrediting her complaints to management 
about questionable food handling practices in the deli or who were personally interested 
in ostracizing Robel in the workplace. The audience of the statements was Fred Meyer's 
customers, workers and managers. All would have been aware of the animosity between 
Robel and other coworkers. Words such as "snitch," "squealer," and "liar" would have 
registered, if at all, as expressions of personal opinion, not as statements of fact. 
According to the court, customers hearing the comments would reasonably perceive that 
the speaker was an antagonistic or resentful coworker. 
To determine whether genuine issues of material fact relating to defamatory words 
and falsity exist, I must necessarily examine the challenged statements against the 
available evidence. I later explore the context in which Sommer published his 
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statements. Michael Sommer's website no longer exists, so the court may not review the 
website as a whole, including its design and layout. We must rely on snapshots taken of 
some of the contents. 
I divide the alleged defamatory statements of Michael Sommer into four 
descriptions: the pine trees, the terrain, the western Washington, and the counselor 
remarks. The pine trees comment declared: 
What you get . . . A visual experience of pine trees, dead pine trees, 
falling down pine trees, disintegrated pine trees, and more pine trees. 
CP at 248. Pine trees grow in the physical world and thus their existence and condition 
can be perceived objectively. The ordinary person would consider the statement one of 
fact. 
Michael Sommer's comment refers to pine trees five times. On two of the 
references, he does not write that the pine trees are fallen, injured or ill. A sixth and later 
reference mentions pine trees without describing them as ill or dead. Thus, the reader 
could conclude that some beautiful trees lay on Life Designs' land. Sommer does not 
quantify the number of respiring trees or contrast the quick trees with the dead trees. Life 
Designs presents evidence that its trees live but does not dispute that its land includes 
some dismembered, decaying, or dead trees. Therefore, Life Designs presents no issue of 
fact as to the falsity of the pine trees statement. 
Life Designs next complains about Michael Sommer's terrain remark. The 
website declared: 
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River, can't be seen. Mountains, can't be seen. Civilization, can't 
be seen. But there are pine trees!!!!! 
CP at 248. Whether one can view a river and mountains from a section ofland can be 
determined objectively. The ordinary person would consider the statement one of fact. 
Life Designs presents evidence countering Michael Sommer's statement denying the 
scenic view on Life Designs' land. 
Michael Sommer likens his terrain remark to one expressing that she was not 
impressed with a view or landmark by declaring "I don't see what's so great" about the 
scene or landmark. If so, Sommer inadequately expressed this concept. A reasonable 
reader could conclude that Sommer accuses Life Designs as misrepresenting its pastoral 
location by untruthfully claiming a river and mountains can be seen. 
Life Designs next complains about a western Washington reference. Sommers 
wrote: 
What you get ... 2 or 3 twelve step meetings a week in a very small 
western Washington community where the only young adults in attendance 
are those from Life Designs ranch. 
CP at248. 
Life Designs only complains about Sommer's comment that Life Designs ranch 
lies in western Washington. Washingtonians generally divide the state into eastern and 
western halves by the Cascade Range. One viewing a map of the Evergreen State may 
question, however, whether some locations in central Washington should be considered 
in western or eastern Washington. Nevertheless, no one would conclude that property 
16 
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lying near Cusick, Pend Oreille County, is in western Washington. Pend Oreille County 
borders Idaho. Michael Sommer's statement is objectively false. 
Michael Sommer claims his designating Life Designs ranch as being in or near a 
western Washington community references the State of Washington as being a western 
state, not the ranch lying in a western portion of the state. He asserts that his statement 
meant that Cusick is a "small western community in the State of Washington." 
Respondent's Br. at 21. The average reader would conclude otherwise. On his website, 
the word "western" preceded Washington, not community. I am to invest Sommer's 
words with their natural and obvious meaning. 
I question whether Michael Sommer's erroneous location of a dependency 
recovery ranch in western, rather than eastern, Washington would injure the reputation of 
the ranch. Perhaps some eastern Washington residents would consider a western 
Washington location to be intolerable because of the crazy liberals on the west side of the 
mountains. Nevertheless, the lack of damage to reputation was not argued by Sommer. 
Finally, Life Designs complains about Michael Sommer's website statement 
concerning the experience of counselors at Life Designs Ranch. Sommers declared: 
You should go to Life Designs if: ... You believe that it takes no 
education or experience with substance abuse, or compassion for the young 
adult who is recovering from a substance addiction to help them become 
the person they want to be. 
CP at 249. 
Michael Sommer did not expressly declare that counselors lacked experience or 
17 
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education with substance abuse or compassion for young people. Nevertheless, reading 
the website as a whole leads the reader to conclude such. The strong implication is that 
Life Designs' staff lacks the training, sympathy, and empathy desirous in a substance 
recovery counselor. Life Designs presents facts refuting the truthfulness of the statement. 
Criticizing the qualifications of a business' staff injures the business' reputation. 
Michael Sommer wrote all of his allegedly false statements on a website critical of 
Life Designs. Sommer used a web address similar in nature to Life Designs' address. In 
his deposition, Sommer conceded he used the address to communicate with potential 
clients of Life Designs. As noted in his June 26, 2012 e-mail message to Life Designs, he 
intended to destroy the reputation of the addiction recovery center. Sommer did not post 
his comments on a blog that allowed competing viewpoints. Reading all comments in 
light of the entire website does little to change the meaning or impression given or soften 
the sting of the remarks. 
The majority discounts Michael Sommer's defamatory statements on the ground 
that the reader should consider the statements exaggerations of an angry customer. The 
majority emphasizes the site's language: "Healing is not done and seems to be very 
limited in it's [sic] attempt." CP at 251. The majority concludes that the word "seems" 
should lead a reader to consider all statements on the site to be of opinion. I disagree. 
The site contained some obvious exaggerations of an irate customer, but the Sommer 
website contained more. The website included provable statements of false fact injurious 
18 
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to Life Designs. 
The majority reasons that a reader of Michael Sommer's website could also enter 
and read Life Designs' authentic website to obtain a countervailing view or the corrected 
facts. No principle of law excuses defamatory statements on the ground that the reader 
may fmd the true facts elsewhere. 
I 
I 
In this postmodern information era ofhistory, many consumers glean information 
about products and services on the Internet. For some young consumers, the web is the 
only source of information. One is often cautioned about believing everything read on 
the Internet. But no decision grants immunity for falsehoods posted on the web. Because 
of ready access to the Internet, such falsehoods may ruin a business' reputation quicker 
,. 
than older forms of communication. One's reputation can be sullied as much by the 
Internet as the local community grapevine in a bygone era. Because the creator of a 
website often remains anonymous, the reader is unable to contact the speaker of 
defamatory words to question the truth of the statements. 
The only Washington decision addressing a claim of defamation based on a 
website is Janaszak v. State, 173 Wn. App. 703, 297 P.3d 723 (2013). This court 
affirmed a summary judgment dismissal of Eric Janaszak's claim based on the 
Washington Department of Health's posting of, on its website, a notice that the 
department restricted Janaszak's license for practicing dentistry after he engaged in sex 
with patients. This court dismissed the suit on the basis of a privilege. Although the 
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State did not argue the point, this court did not suggest that the law of defamation 
changes when the defendant uttered the defamatory communique on a website. 
The Federal Communication Decency Act of 1996 grants immunity from 
defamation claims to the administrator of a website or an internet service provider. 47 
U.S.C. § 230(a). The act does not shield the author ofthe defamatory statement, even if 
the author is the administrator of the site. Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local456, 781 F.3d 
25 (2d Cir. 2015); Cisneros v. Sanchez, 403 F. Supp. 2d 588, 591-92 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
Other courts have held defamatory factual statements posted on the Internet, even in chat 
rooms, can gamer liability. Taylor Bldg. Corp. v. Benfield, 507 F. Supp. 2d 832 (S.D. 
Ohio 2007); Marczeski v. Law, 122 F. Supp. 2d 315 (D. Conn. 2000); SPXCorp. v. Doe, 
253 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Bently Reserve L.P. v. Papaliolios, 218 Cal. App. 
4th 418, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 423 (2013); Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209, 20 
A. 3d 364 (20 11 ). 
In Bently Reserve L.P. v. Papaliolios, a tenant anonymously posted a review of his 
former landlord and apartment on the popular Yelp website. The posting read: 
Sadly, the Building is (newly) owned and occupied by a sociopathic 
narcissist-who celebrates making the lives of tenants hell. Of the 16 
mostly-long-term tenants who lived in the Building when the new owners 
moved in, the new owners' noise, intrusions, and other abhorrent behaviors 
(likely) contributed to the death of three tenants (Pat, Mary, & John), and 
the departure of eight more (units 1001, 902, 802,801, 702,701,602, 502) 
in very short order. Notice how they cleared-out all the upper-floor units, 
so they could charge higher rents? 
They have sought evictions of 6 of those long-term tenants, even 
though rent was paid-in-full, and those tenants bothered nobody. And what 
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they did to evict the occupants of unit# 902, who put many oftens of 
thousands of dollars into their unit, was horrific and shameful. 
This is my own first-hand experience with this building, and its 
owners. I know this situation well, as I had the misfortune of being in a 
relationship with one of the Building's residents at the time, have spent 
many days and nights over many years in the Building, and have personally 
witnessed the abhorrent behavior of the owners of the Building. 
There is NO RENT that is low enough to make residency here 
worthwhile. 
218 Cal. App. 4th at 423. 
The Bently Reserve appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the tenant's 
motion to dismiss the landlord's defamation suit. The tenant claimed that Internet fora 
are notorious as places where readers expect to see strongly worded opinions rather than 
objective facts and that anonymous opinions should be discounted accordingly. The 
court noted that commentators have likened cyberspace to a frontier society free from the 
conventions and constraints that limit discourse in the real world. The court disagreed 
and ruled that the mere fact speech is broadcast across the Internet by an anonymous 
speaker does not make it nonactionable opinion and immune from defamation law. 
HYPERLINK 
The organization Human Earth Animal Liberation (HEAL) operated a website 
critical of Life Designs and other addiction recovery businesses. The website accused 
Life Designs of functioning like a cult and illegally exploiting student labor. Michael 
Sommer did not repeat, on his website, the critical remarks made by HEAL on its site. 
Sommer, however, provided the reader of his site a hyper link to the HEAL site. I agree 
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with the majority that Sommer, as a matter of law, does not incur liability in defamation 
for the hyperlink. I need not add to the majority's analysis. 
PRESUMED DAMAGES 
The majority also affirms summary judgment dismissal of Life Designs' 
defamation action on the basis that Life Designs failed to submit facts showing Michael 
Sommer's website caused damages. I disagree for two reasons. First, because Life 
Designs presented facts supporting defamation per se, Life Designs need not show actual 
damages. Sommer does not argue that, assuming Life Designs prevails in defamation per 
se, he need not prove damages. Second, Life Designs provided facts showing damages. 
This section of the opinion discusses presumed damages for defamation per se. 
Since the majority dismisses Life Designs' defamation per se allegation, the 
majority ignores the rule freeing Life Designs from proving economic loss. Defamation 
per se is actionable without proof of special damages. Amsbury v. Cowles Pub/ 'g Co., 76 
Wn.2d at 737 (1969). Conversely, a defamation plaintiff may recover presumptive 
damages if he shows he has been referred to by words libelous per se. Maison de France, 
Ltd. v. Mais Oui!, Inc., 126 Wn. App. at 53-54 (2005); Haueter v. Cowles Pub/'g. Co., 61 
Wn. App. at 578 ( 1991 ). The defamed person is entitled to substantial damages without 
proving actual damages. Waechter v. Carnation Co., 5 Wn. App. at 128 (1971). 
Statements falling within the per se categories are thought to be so obviously and 
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materially harmful to a plaintiff that damage can be presumed. Arnold v. Nat 'l Union of 
Marine Cooks & Stewards, 44 Wn.2d 183, 187,265 P.2d 1051 (1954). 
Michael Sommer contends that Life Designs cannot prove damages because the 
business cannot identifY anyone who read the contents of Sommer's website. One 
wonders how Life Designs could locate readers of another's website. Defamation per se 
is designed to assist businesses like Life Designs that may encounter difficulties in proof. 
Proof of actual damage will be impossible in a great many cases when, from the character 
of the defamatory words and circumstances of publication, it is all but certain that serious 
harm has resulted in fact. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
749,760 (1985) (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, Law ofTorts § 112 at 765 (4thed. 1971)). 
In Demopolis v. Peoples National Banko[ Washington, 59 Wn. App. 105, 796 
P .2d 426 ( 1990), the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant in a 
defamation case, in part because plaintiff had proved no damages. This court reversed on 
the ground that defendant accused plaintiff of a crime. Since plaintiff established an 
action for defamation per se, plaintiff did not need to prove any actual damages. 
In Maison de France, Ltd. v. Mais Oui!, Inc., 126 Wn. App. 34 (2005), the 
defendant falsely claimed that law enforcement agencies investigated the plaintiff for 
fraud. The trial court found no economic or other damages and thus denied recovery. 
This court reversed and directed the trial court to award presumed damages. 
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Some cases refer to "actual damages" and other cases refer to "special damages" 
as the form of damages not needing proof in defamation per se. Some decisions use both 
terms. Presumably the two mean the same. See Haueter v. Cowles Publ'g. Co., 61 Wn. 
App. at 578 (1991). Special damages, according to the Restatement, include any 
pecuniary or economic loss. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 575, cmt. b 
(1977). 
GARRETT DECLARATION 
I now address whether, assuming Life Designs did not show facts sufficient to 
sustain a claim for defamation per se, Life Designs otherwise defeats a summary 
judgment motion against an argument that it showed no damages to support a defamation 
suit. Before discussing the law of damages, I must first address an evidentiary question 
important to this issue. 
In opposition to Michael Sommer's summary judgment motion, Life Designs filed 
an affidavit of its former admissions director, Clay Garrett. Garrett not surprisingly 
testified that a recovery center's reputation is a primary factor in obtaining clients. 
Garrett averred that, upon Michael Sommer opening his website, the Life Designs 
website visits remained constant, but referrals from consultants and clients decreased. 
Life Designs suffered an approximate fifty six percent decline in referrals during the 
period when Sommer published the defamatory content to the public. This equates to 
nine to twelve clients that Life Designs lost because of Sommer's website. Garrett insists 
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that Sommer's Internet site caused a decline in clients and income. When someone 
searched the web for Life Designs addiction recovery center, the searcher also was given 
the web address for Sommer's site. 
On appeal, Michael Sommer claims that the trial court struck the declaration of 
Clay Garrett, because the declaration contained opinions, for which Garrett is not 
qualified to utter. The record does not support this claim. Regardless, Sommer argues on 
appeal that this court should ignore the testimony of Garrett. This argument would be 
dispositive only if Life Designs failed to establish defamation per se. Resolution of the 
argument looms important in determining whether Life Designs presents an issue of fact 
as to actual damages. 
ER 702 governs testimony by expert witnesses. The rule reads: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education,may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Michael Sommer belittles Clay Garrett's qualifications, in part, because Garrett 
holds a herpetology degree. Sommer fails to recognize that a witness qualifies as an 
expert in more ways than education. Witnesses may qualify as experts by practical 
experience. State v. Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d 294, 310, 831 P .2d 1060 (1992); Acord v. Pettit, 
174 Wn. App. 95, 111, 302 P.3d 1265 (2013). An expert may be qualified to testify by 
experience alone. In reMarriage ofKatare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 38,283 P.3d 546 (2012); 
Tay/orv. Bell, 185 Wn. App. 270,285,340 P.3d 951 (2014). Once the basic requisite 
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qualifications are established, any deficiencies in an expert's qualifications go to the 
weight, rather than the admissibility, of his testimony. In re Welfare of Young, 24 Wn. 
App. 392, 397, 600 P.2d 1312 (1979); Larson v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 11 Wn. App. 557, 
524 P.2d 251 (1974). 
Clay Garrett qualifies as an expert on the business of addiction recovery, the 
importance of a business' reputation, factors causing damage to a business' reputation, 
and the business affairs of Life Designs. Garrett was Life Designs' employee. He began 
working for Life Designs on December 15, 2010. He became director of admissions in 
early 2012. As director of admissions, Garrett gained intimate knowledge of the reasons 
by which clients chose Life Designs and obstacles that impacted that choice. 
Clay Garrett worked for ten years at the Dallas Zoological Society and was the 
director of a scouting program. He later worked as a mentor and field director at a 
wilderness treatment program for young adults in Santa Clara, Utah. At Life Designs, 
Garrett worked in many capacities including that of a mentor, life coach, and program 
and admissions director. As a program and admissions director, Garrett developed new 
business, helped redesign the business' website, and interfaced with educational 
consultants who referred clients to recovery centers. 
The majority holds that Clay Garrett was qualified as an expert to testify. I readily 
agree. Whereas, a court may sometimes limit a qualified expert to the scope of his 
testimony, the majority imposes no limitations on Garrett. The majority instead, in its 
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hurried analysis, fails to recognize the implications of its holding. I address those 
repercussions later. 
CAUSATION AND DAMAGES 
In a defamation action, the plaintiff may recover compensation for damage to 
reputation, emotional distress, bodily harm, and economic or special damages. 
Schmalenberg v. Tacoma News, Inc., 87 Wn. App. at 589 n.56 (1977); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS at 197, 319, 321, 322, 325. The defamation must be the proximate 
cause of the damages. Schmalenberg v. Tacoma News, Inc., 87 Wn. App. at 599 n.56. 
Even if Life Designs failed to establish defamation per se, it presents sufficient facts to 
defeat a motion to dismiss its defamation claim on the elements of causation and 
damages. 
Michael Sommer emphasizes the rule of logic caged in the Latin locution: "post 
hoc, ergo propter hoc" or "after this, therefore because of this." The axiom should be 
stated in the converse: an event or condition is not necessarily caused by an occurrence or 
circumstance that preceded it. According to Sommer and the majority, Life Designs does 
not create an issue of fact by showing that its business declined after Sommer began his 
website. 
In Anica v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 Wn. App. 481 (2004 ), this court relied on 
this logical fallacy when affirming a summary judgment dismissal of Lorena Anica's 
claim of wrongful termination from employment. Wal-Mart terminated Anica's 
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employment after her return to work from time off to recover from her second job injury. 
Anica argued that the timing of her tennination provided sufficient evidence of causation 
to survive a summary judgment motion. Evidence, however, verified that the Social 
Security Administration had recently contacted Wal·Mart and notified the store that 
Anica's social security number was false. After Anica failed to fix the number anomaly, 
corporate offices told the local store to fire Anica. 
Anica v. Wal·Mart Stores must be contrasted with Borden v. City of Olympia, 113 
Wn. App. 359, 53 P.3d 1020 (2002). The Bordens sued Olympia after their property 
flooded. In November 1995, the city completed a new stormwater drainage system near 
the Borden land. In February 1996, ponds formed in the Borden's yard and the basement 
flooded. The flooding continued thereafter. When the city redesigned the system and 
redirected the wastewater flow, the flooding ceased. The Bordens complained that 
Olympia negligently designed the 1995 system. The trial court granted the city summary 
judgment. On appeal, this court determined that facts supported a breach of duty and 
causation of damages. This court reversed the summary judgment on the negligence 
claim. 
The Borden Court asked whether a trier of fact could rationally find that 
Olympia's project proximately caused damage to the Bordens. Taken in the light most 
favorable to the Bordens, the record showed that flooding to their property started the 
first winter after the 1995 project was completed. The flooding recurred each winter for 
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the next several years. The flooding subsided when another drainage facility channeled 
water away from the Bordens' land and into the headwaters of a nearby creek. According 
to the court, this coincidence in timing gave rise to an inference that the flooding was a 
proximate result of the 1995 drainage project. 
Based on Anica v. Wal-Mart Stores, timing may not be sufficient on its own to 
raise a question of fact of causation. Nevertheless, according to Borden v. City of 
Olympia, timing is a significant factor to consider. 
The majority distinguishes Borden v. City of Olympia on two grounds. First, the 
Bordens sued the city for negligence, not defamation. The majority intimates that the 
rules of causation change in a defamation action. The majority cites no law for this 
implication. There is no law. If the majority's implied ruling is correct, the majority 
should avoid principles discussed in Anica v. Wal-Mart, since Anica is not a defamation 
suit. 
The majority also distinguishes Borden v. City of Olympia with the important 
distinction that the flooding of the Bordens' property ended when Olympia redesigned its 
storm drainage system. Life Designs presented no testimony that its business recovered 
after Michael Sommer removed his website. Of course, Life Designs can argue that the 
damage had been done and the cessation of the website did not restore its reputation. 
Redesigning the city stormwater system physically changed the flow of the water, 
whereas defamatory statements may linger in the minds of hearers long after the 
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defendant ceases publication of the statements. Defamation's stormwaters may persist 
even after a redirection. 
Borden v. City of Olympia and the majority's ruling may be based on the principle 
that when damage ends after defendant's wrongful conduct ends, the plaintiff proves 
causation. This ruling is also logically false under the same principle. Just because the 
Bordens' flooding ended after the city redesigned its system does not mean that the 
redesign ended the flooding. Of course, Borden has two critical events that assist in 
resolving causation, the beginning of operations of the system project and cessation of the 
system. Logicians have yet to announce the fallacy of "after this but not after this endeth, 
therefore this." 
Some commonsense based on experience should enter the discussion of causation. 
When a man bangs his head against the wall, after which his head hurts, we conclude that 
the banging caused the hurt. When a woman is in a rear end collision, after which her 
neck hurts, the law allows a physician to testify that the car accident caused a whiplash, 
regardless of whether imaging studies confirm the lack of soft tissue injury before the 
accident or presence of tissue injury after the accident. An injured party's testimony 
alone of pain after an accident is sufficient to permit the jury to award damages for that 
pain and future pain. Bitzan v. Parisi, 88 Wn.2d 116, 122, 558 P.2d 775 (1977). For 
purposes of a summary judgment motion, the law accepts the truthfulness of the accident 
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victim when she states that after an accident she garnered pain and therefore the pain is 
related to the accident. The jury can later judge the credibility of the victim. 
The law might permit Clay Garrett to testify as a lay witness that the defamation 
published by Michael Sommer caused Life Designs damages. The majority has gone one 
step further and qualified Garrett as an expert witness. He is in a similar position to a 
treating physician in a personal injury suit. 
Clay Garrett avers that, during the time Michael Sommer operated his website, 
Life Designs' referral rate plummeted by fifty six percent and the business lost five to 
nine clients. Based on his experience, Sommer opined that the website caused the lack of 
business. No case requires Life Designs to identify a lost costumer as a condition to 
recovering lost income. Thus, Life Designs presents a jury question of damages. A trier 
of fact can later decide the credibility of Garrett's testimony. Michael Sommer raises a 
good argument that the HEAL website could have caused all of Life Designs' damages. 
This good argument should be presented to the jury. 
The majority criticizes the reasoning and the relevance of the data on which Clay 
Garrett justified his opinion. Once this court qualified Garrett as an expert, however, 
Garrett did not even need to disclose the facts or data on which he supported his 
conclusion. ER 705. 
Michael Sommer should not be surprised that his website caused a loss of business 
to Life Designs. He threatened to harm Life Designs' reputation. Damage to Life 
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Designs was Sommer's stated goal. In his June 26 message to Vince Barranco, Sommer 
wrote, in part: 
I am willing to get legal with this. Are you? I would hope that the 
most important thing to you is your reputation. We all know how easily 
reputations can be destroyed, without the legal system even getting 
involved. But I would go both routes if I have to. 
CP at 257. 
The elements of damages and causation run together in this case. Proximate cause 
has two elements, cause in fact cause and legal causation. Schooley v. Pinch's Deli Mlct., 
Inc., 134 Wn.2d 468,478,951 P.2d 749 (1998). Cause in fact asks whether damages 
would have occurred but for the wrongful conduct of the defendant. Hartley v. State, 103 
Wn.2d 768, 778, 698 P.2d 77 (1985). Legal causation addresses policy considerations as 
to how far the consequences of defendant's acts should extend. Hartley v. State, 103 
Wn.2d at 779. A proximate cause is one that in natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by an independent cause, produces the injury complained of and without which 
the ultimate injury would not have occurred. Schooley, 134 Wn.2d at 478; Bernethy v. 
Walt Failor's, Inc., 97 Wn.2d 929, 935, 653 P.2d 280 (1982). The plaintiff need not 
establish causation by direct and positive evidence, but only by a chain of circumstances 
from which the ultimate fact required is reasonably and naturally inferable. Teig v. St. 
John's Hosp., 63 Wn.2d 369,381, 387 P.2d 527 (1963); Conrad ex rel. Conrad v. 
A/derwood Manor, 119 Wn. App. 275, 281, 78 P.3d 177 (2003). 
Generally, the issue of proximate causation is a question for the jury. Berne thy v. 
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Walt Failor's, Inc., 97 Wn.2d at 935 (1982); Attwood v. Albertson's Food Ctr., Inc., 92 
Wn. App. 326, 330, 966 P.2d 351 (1998). Only when the facts are undisputed and the 
inferences therefrom are plain and incapable of reasonable doubt or difference of opinion 
may the court remove the question from the jury. Bernethy, 97 Wn.2d at 935. In its 
abbreviated analysis, the majority weighs the facts relevant to causation. By ruling as a 
matter oflaw on the issue of damages, the majority usurps the role of the jury. 
A foreign decision of limited relevance is State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. 
Radcliff, 987 N.E. 2d 121 (Ct. App. Ind. 2013). State Farm sued Joseph Radcliff and 
Radcliffs company for fraud and racketeering arising out ofRadcliffs assistance to State 
Farm policyholders in recovering damages for a large hailstorm in central Indiana. 
Radcliff counterclaimed for defamation because of State Farm's broadcasting of Radcliff 
engaging in fraudulent and criminal practices. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed a 
$14.5 million verdict in favor of Radcliff. In affirming the verdict, the appellate court 
rejected State Farm's argument that the trial court impermissibly allowed Radcliffs 
economic expert to testify that articles on the Internet, prompted by State Farm's 
allegations, created a negative situation for Radcliff that impacted his business prospects 
in the future. The expert exclaimed "the challenge with the internet is that once 
something is on the internet, it's virtually impossible to get rid ofit." State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co. 987 N.E.2d at 154 (Ct. App. Ind. 2013). 
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FALSE LIGHT 
I concur with the majority that a corporation may not recover for the tort of false 
light. I also concur that Vincent and Bobbie Barranco did not show damages to sustain 
an action in false light. 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS EXPECTANCY 
The majority writes that Life Designs created issues of fact as to each substantive 
element of the tort of interference with a business expectancy. I agree. Thus, I will not 
list the elements of the tort or analyze the evidence in relationship to all elements. 
The majority affirms summary judgment dismissal of the tortious interference 
cause of action on the basis that Life Designs has not presented evidence of damages. 
Resultant damage is an element of the tort. Leingang v. Pierce County Med. Bureau, 
Inc., 131 Wn.2d 133, 157, 930 P.2d 288 (1997). In reviewing the evidence on appeal, the 
majority conducts the same analysis performed when holding that Life Designs showed 
no damages to support its defamation claim. The majority writes that no potential client 
or referral source submitted an affidavit establishing that he or she did not choose Life 
Designs because of Michael Sommer's website. The majority cites no authority for the 
proposition that the plaintiff must present evidence from a customer or potential customer 
in order to sustain a claim for tortious interference. Washington law imposes no such 
requirement. ~. J. Feari!li,J~ ) 
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